Dec 24, 2020 — The concept of recognition” (Anerkennung) is an increasingly important tenet in the philosophical area linked to political-social.
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Submit Manuscript | http://medcraveonline.comIntroduction The concept of recognitionfl ( Anerkennung) is an increasingly important tenet in the philosophical area linked to political-social to examine his complex and vast elaboration developed in many several years and writings, outlined by him himself again in another 1 But the theoretical association between struggle and recognition is very labile, based rather on a contradictory 2 Such an association identity already immediately presupposed and on the other side a sort of teleology for something absolutely constitutive and always already not suitable for imposition or competitive cogence, the recognition or cognitive faculty, but a ‚crisis™, a gap of identity, not the proper or authentic identity, but an identity wanting, void, ‚privative™, quasi ‚asocial™, more pre-political than ‚political™ (perhaps also and then recognition and the same simple talking about it emerged in modern epoch because of increasingly acute The present research would aim almost entirely only at confronting Honneth™s theory with Hegel™s position, considering that Honneth himself explicitly declares to theoretically depend on scheme of the System of ethical life (Das System der Sittlichkeit 1802/3),3 the third section of spirit™s philosophy in Das System der speculative 1H Anerkennung. Eine europäische Ideegeschichte 12A diverse opinion, akin to Honneth, is expressed in Barba-Kay Why Journal of the History of Philosophy. 23Hegel Schriften und Entwürfe (1799-1808) , in Gesammelte WerkeV GW 5 System of Ethical Life(1802/3) and First Philosophy of Spirit (Part III of the System of Speculative Philosophy 1803/4) 3Philosphie (System of speculative Philosophy 1803/4)4 and above all Real philosophie 5 discover the notion of struggle for recognition , above all in Kampf um Anerkennung 6 According to the contemporary theorist 4Hegel Das System der speculativen Philosophie , Gesammelte WerkeVI , GW 645Hegel , in Gesammelte Werke VIII GW 86H Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer The Struggle for RecognitionThe 5 However, an aspect is to outline, attainable from the lexical choice related to the Hennig Allgemeine Zeitschriftfür Philosophie 6, in which the following, paraphs crucial elements of social reality, the notion becomes fruitless for empirical Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie™, in Alterität und Anerkennung Sigwart H fl, , GeschichtederKampf um Anerkennung 8 etherbridge Axel Honneth: Critical Essays. With A Replay by Axel Honneth 9 Axel Honnethfl, Consecutio Rerum. Rivista criticadella Postmodernità , 2011, 10 What is too unclear, is to know whether it is plausible to talk about a grammar linked to a or the moral context, in addition completely marked by to the laws of a linguistic grammar (not so much for the language in itself), recognition should depend on a condition of ‚primitive™, spontaneous, indeed infractions or recognitions of denied rights of everyone or exclusively some naturally given Art Human Open Acc J. 2020;4(6):228234.228©2020 Ricci. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License , which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and build upon your work non-commercially. Is there a struggle for recognition? In comparing Hegel and HonnethVolume 4 Issue 6 – 2020 Vittorio Ricci Department of Letters and Philosophy, University Tor Vergata Rome, Italy Correspondence: Vittorio Ricci, Department of Letters and Philosophy, University Tor Vergata Rome, Via Camminate 78- 03030 Posta Fibreno (FR), Italy, Tel 3312062137, Email Received: November 05, 2020 | Published: December 24, 2020AbstractThe present analysis tries to cast serious doubt about Honneth™s connection between thesis results paradoxical in many respects and theoretically almost inconsistent, a mere baseless overlapping of what should means both the more obvious notion and real existence of society as well as those of individual, his reference to Hegel™s recognition idea, substantially linked to a ‚pre-social™, ‚pre-political™, as well as naturally primitive and eventual atmosphere and scenario, seems extremely inappropriate and variously arbitrary, although this operation shows an emphatical exigence of objective foundation of what is Keywords: Hegel, Honneth, society, individuals, recognition Arts & Humanities Open Access Journal Research Article Open Access

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229Citation: Ricci V. Is there a struggle for recognition? In comparing Hegel and Honneth. Art Human Open Acc J. 2020;4(6):228234. DOI: 10.15406/ahoaj.2020.04.00174through original idea of building a social theory on the basis of an inter subjectivist account, theme and methodology, abandoned by the idealist mature philosopher, simply for such an argument should be on Hegel™s philosophy of right keeps this critical criterion; above all in Suffering from Indeterminacy (1999) and Das Recht der Freiheit (2011) 8 Honneth conceives and focuses the theoretical elements as inter subjective interaction of cooperating subjects and the social However, this analysis would be limited to show that Honneth™s interpretation about Hegel™s description of recognising process personal reinterpretations (indeed sometimes true mystifying traits) are highlightable periods and steps his theory of Anerkennung with also different always and substantially inherent to the dimension of consciousness as a strategically vital self-building, but not strictly as true or a recognition as a ‚pre-political™ motive with traits of historical type, necessary to the self-conscious or personal formation in order to conceptually justify the structure of philosophical system, but it is not juridical determinations, the moral/ethical situations and the political institution are elements developed in a ‚post-recognitive™ urgencies and agencies so that individuals thereby are generally set already in a superior ambit with other dynamic articulations and cultural En passant empirically, the noun Anerkennung has been very rarely found in Hegel™s mentioned works instead of the verb Anerkennen After all, the recognition seems to be a simply ‚archaic™ instrument of transforming into a certain ‚metaphysic™ entity a mere empirical it doesn™t matter), an immediate (indeterminate) (self-)perception, eventual negation of such a recognition shouldn™t mean or involve its it seems necessary to distinguish a social recognition concerning a superordinate ‚acquisition™, something acquired, whereby a certain overlapping in the case of something innate or ontological more or and generally every notion concerning ‚sociality™ of the human being ‚society™ means or effectively is, represents something extremely politicon zoon and without H Suffering from Indeterminacy. Spinoza Lectures. Amsterdam; Leiden an Unbestimmtheit. Eine Reaktualisierung der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie.118H Das Recht der Freiheit. Grundriß einer demokratischen Sittlichkeit 12particularly respect, for instance the sense of indeterminacy or several Honneth™s hermeneutical perspectives about Hegel™s notion of recognition Kampf um Anerkennung ,beyond Historische Vergegenwärtigung: HegelsursprünglicheIdee ), Honneth begins stating that Hegel by refuting Kant™s mere ought- demand (Sollensforderung ) inherent to his idea of individual wirksam) element of social effectivenessfl (alseinhistorischbereitswirksam der sozialenWirklichkeit 9 Wirklichkeit , generally Wirklichkeit , especially in Hegel™s interest concerns mainly the adjective ‚social™ that should distinguish reviewed with semantical and theoretical differentiations impossible to propose a description of recognition process as autonomous self- of system within the Hegelian philosophy or at least as it should be concept is not only fundamental, but also the essential principle, the Honneth probably is not interested to textually interpret Hegel™s ethical doctrine of the idealistic thinker, especially in dealing with his 10 A particular study on Honneth™s critical mechanism and multifaceted polysemy in Hegel seems generally an Although there are several also deep transformations of Hegelian approaches and frameworks in general and hence inherent to the 9Honneth, Kampf about the relation between Kant™s moral doctrine and Hegel™s concept of Sittlichkeit to the politological task, Hegel himself would have undertaken in the time Hermeneutically, even if Honneth cannot be expected to offer a complete and here a mere mention of Fichte™s also monolithically, without even recalling Hegel™s conception of nature , inherited from Fichte™s Naturrecht and indispensable to focus more authentically and fully on his theoretical movement about the ethical framework also in this ance oyar Oxford Handbook of Hegel p),13 even if Honneth shows passim to know perfectly these essential expletory La natura del riconoscimento. Riconoscimento naturale e autocoscienza sociale in Hegel Giovanni, 2010;14 H The Owl of Minerva.1510 S . Anerkennung als Prinzip der praktischen Philosophie. Untersuchungen zu Hegels Jenaer Philosophie des Geistes 16

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230Citation: Ricci V. Is there a struggle for recognition? In comparing Hegel and Honneth. Art Human Open Acc J. 2020;4(6):228234. DOI: 10.15406/ahoaj.2020.04.00174 change of its essence and function starting from the Phenomenology of Spirit biographically real within Hegel™s theoretical evolution are content, articulation and elements of spirit™s science and particularly notion Sittlichkeit, after its occurrence in Hegel™s early writing System der Sittlichkeit of Encyclopaedia Giusti,11 in order to avail himself of his good judged presentation of concept Sitten Sitten and that of Sittlichkeit do not Hegel™s ethical idea in System der Sittlichkeit (System of ethical Life) along with the various forms of recognition Researching in this present analysis whether the aspect of sociality acknowledged by Honneth exists or not in Hegel™s conception of recognition as described in his early works before Phenomenology of Spirit dimension is indispensable in order to conceive and explain the System of ethical Life lifefl ( Idee der absoluten Sittlichkeit ), as written at its beginning, is a concept seeming pretty polyvalent but not pertinent to a social situation, at least in the sense of more or less ‚organised™ ensemble mentioned oeuvre is at a passage where the labour (Arbeit) 12 The persistent in the single onefl (nurbeständigimeinzelnen (die allgemeine Wechselwirkung und Bildung der Menschen This relation is the temporal sum of all instants whereby the equality of opposites remains only interior; in fact, according to the universal Hegel and exterior differencefl ( Ein Anerkennen, das gegenseitig ist, oder die höchste Individualität und aüssere Differenz difference is exclusively exterior, something unsuitable to a real differentiation, only extrinsically perceived unable to produce the realityor the effectiveness of a mutual interior identity and inner install itself in a pre-ethical and so pre-institutional context at every historical™ phenomenon, in the complete natural indeterminacy, in a void interiority potentially open to every event, wherein all is possible there is no true (hi)story, even if expressed still in a merely intuitive modality, but only the absolute precondition of every historical 11 Hegels Kritik der modernen Welt: Über die Auseinandersetzung mit den geschichtlichen und systematischen Grundlagen der praktischen Philosophie 12GW VThe second occurrence lies in the passage concerning semiotic tönende Rede 13 einstumme Anerkennen) or a mere physical, 14 15 as articulation uniting objective and subjective entities belonging to or the intelligence as something constituting the highest singularity and individuality; the psychological subjectivity ensures the precise and unmistakable entity necessary to a language and hence to the a linguistic perspective is absolutely necessary to understand Hegel™s concept of recognition, because it contains singularity™s structure, individuality™s form, that proper and exclusive of a human being, but it is going to pay attention, the question concerns only form without content, remembering that binomial combination form/content is singularly meaningful for Hegel™s philosophical and systematic constitution of transition from natural sphere or realm of particularity to spiritual or human sphere or better realm of individuality which remains substantially formal, uncompleted, unilateral in its early own universality and so equality, is the reason of ethical structure or Sittlichkeit Hegel develops several modalities and conceptions during his all System of ethical life , it is unequivocally neat that recognition is seen belonging to the only form of ideality with the consequence that it is previous to ethical of the highest rationality and shape of singularityfl ( die Abstraction der höchstenVernünftigkeit und Gestalt der Einzelheit base of recognition process is viewed by Honneth as well, but mainly on account of a particular study of Siegfried Blasche (birth of a new 16 ethical life; it involves something different from the linguistic one, to the particular through labour and possession ( Arbeit und BesitzThe subject is [not] merely determined, as one possessing (einbesitzendes), but taken up into the form of the universality, as a single in relation to others and universally negative, as one possessing einanerkanntesbesitzendes); because the viz. negation) (ideell) in 13Ib. 14Ib. 15Ib. 16Honneth Kampf um Anerkennung Hegel™s conception of family is institution remains always in a natural

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231Citation: Ricci V. Is there a struggle for recognition? In comparing Hegel and Honneth. Art Human Open Acc J. 2020;4(6):228234. DOI: 10.15406/ahoaj.2020.04.00174 recognition to a purely individual subject and outlines an exclusively Among diverse possible valuations the aspect of abstractness is to stress and it induces to deny any inter subjective feature about the that this early Hegel™s account is due to his positive treatment of ein »Erstes« der menschlichen Vergesellschaftung (Wechselwirkung ) among individuals in which Fichtian model consists Rechtsverhältnis ), is taken up by Hegel recognitionfl ( den intersubjektiven Vorgangeiner wechselseitigen Anerkennung of zoon politikon unavailable in Hegel™s System of ethical life , where in the recognition remains a relation of exclusively subjective type vision and are esteemed only as possibility of their opposite cases, for instance the owner-property implies its contrary, namely its lesion Hegelian elaboration referred to criminal actions, as the heading Verbrechen und Sittlichkeit: HegelsintersubjektivitätstheoretischerNeuansatz ), this but Hegel places various distinctions, for example between civil law the recognising to the struggle relationship, almost in inter subjective Lordship/bondage or master/servant and hence to the consciousness™ context, due to a precise step of Further Hegelian determinations of a singularity still incubated and latent despite the recognition Honneth also senses the lack of consciousness™ reference in System der Sittlichkeit, 17 but explains it as a gradual substitution of Aristotle™s finatural teleologyfl (Naturteleologie of Philosophie des Geistes (1804/5), his attention is too excessively Real philosophie 18 as his entire third chapter Der wirkliche Geist Hegel™s conspicuous philosophical transformation in his terms is the new entity is represented by the consciousness which seemed lost after the System of ethical life unlike its conception presented in the future Phenomenology of Spirit and more similar to the subject of objective spirit in the even later Encyclopaedia, it is the key for a correct interpretation of what is Ib.18GW 8 Philosophy of spirit19 die Totalität ), the consciousness in the family has reached, knows ( erkennt) itself consciousness in another such totality [knows] itself as itself (I comment it seems to be the notion of self-consciousness, yet unavailable); (Hegel continues) in this knowing (Erkennen) each is for another immediately an absolute single ( einabsoluteinzelner posits himself in the consciousness of the other one, sublates (hebt [–] auf) the singularity of the other one or each in his consciousness das gegenseitige Anerkennung ) in consciousnesses claiming each other somehow to be a formal absolute provided that every singularity of his possession and of his being is recognition, but for the entire ( um das Ganze), because at this level, undistinguishable from the essential relation to me, to consciousness™ das Nichts des Todes ), because Anerkennen der Einzelnheitder Totalität ) is to be proved ( erweisen) for the other know of the other whether he is absolute consciousnessfl;20 in order Sklav), if who goes up to the death, doesn™t leave the life itself but shows only loss of possession or wounds, hence demonstrates to be no totality; the second conclusion is the mere impossibility of proving the totality onefl (den StreitvordemTödtenaufhebt proved himself as totality nor known the other one as suchfl ( so hat erwedersichalsTotalitäterwiesen, noch den andernalssolchenerkannt essential and inescapable for deeply comprehending the novelty and better the strife is an action putting the end into the process rather than absoluter Widerspruch ), in sense that the consciousness becomes and is works out in quite opposite sense, it is what causes the ethical life; on the contrary, Hegel™s scenario puts the origin of sociality quite into its impossibility, even though only initial, before every socialisation or institutionalisation of reciprocal respect or love (‚agapic™ 21 19GW 6 20Ib. 21The sense of the agape, differentiated from eros and philia, semiotic distinctions owing to the Greek idiom, is subject of a interview addressed to Honneth and reproduced in orio G, C e l™amore come agape Società Mutamento Politica 18

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232Citation: Ricci V. Is there a struggle for recognition? In comparing Hegel and Honneth. Art Human Open Acc J. 2020;4(6):228234. DOI: 10.15406/ahoaj.2020.04.00174 (viz. consciousness) knows itself as sublate done, since equally consequence of producing the absolute consciousness which is absolute or universal ethical life ( absolute Sittlichkeit) the single one Mitgliedeines Volks ) and of consequence an ethical essence ( einsittliches Wesen die lebendige Substanz der allgemeinen Sittlichkeit ); otherwise the ethical eineideelle Form only as sublate donefl ( einesseyendennuralsaufgehobenes all, what is lacking in just described Hegel™s discourse? Clearly the einanerkennender and a minimum of (experienced) freedom, which Hegel believes to Philosophie des Geistes (1805/06), in which a consciousness™ doctrine lacks, mainly for the (1805-06), Hegel had begun projecting and judging the consciousness 22 the recognition remaining linked to the philosophy of spirit could not regard any more the consciousness, even if its process continues to be unavoidable in describing systematically the passage from nature to spirit and consciousness has to concretely act somehow in anthropic psychology, whereby it cannot but resurface in any wayand sometimes stealthily for responding to impellent constraints of theoretical order like this context of recognition process the philosophy of spirit could not be but the practical faculty or the will, because that theoretical faculty or intelligence has no content description is a pure countersense, since the will as practical faculty can no more suffer natural conditions due quite to the lack of adequate content; and this wanting situation is no more possible at moment of writes at the ending of treatment of intelligence before entering will™s 22Hegel Logik, Metaphysik und Naturphilosophie. Systemsentwurf II, Gesammelte Werke VII En passant, through the loss of which it has freed itselffl; 23 the will must face such an empty, evil liberty and does so in several self-developing and gradually self-articulating modes based on the syllogistic movement (Schluß love (die Liebe Erkennen so in the other one and only this being in the other one separates itself 24 Hence not an indeterminate Sich-zum-Dinge-machen),25 but a real objective (anerkannt bestimmter Willen ), natürliches Individuum Selffl (ungebildetesnatürlichesSelbst What is right and duty for the individual in the natural state ?fl ( Naturzustande?He answers in not fully clear way, but he speaks of thought™s movement bringing the determination of right; the concept of individual produces a new condition, develops itself as a different relation, indicates it as person capable of right ( Rechtsfähige), (dißZeichenfällt in mich content is the free Self ( das freyeSelbst of the person in its relationship (that is of the person) to the (person)fl, (Beschränkung limitation there is the object ( der Gegenstand diesesErzeugen desRechtsüberhaupt, d. h. der anerkennendenBeziehung Self) is juridical ( rechtlich Das anerkannte ) is alsunmittelbargeltend) [] This necessity is his own, not that of our thinking in contrast to Honneth also quotes about this passage,26 original difference from traditional approaches and that should be a mutual relations of competition that the moral potential evidenced in individuals™ willingness to reciprocally restrict their own spheres of argument here is merely that all human coexistence presupposes a together or coexistence the same mere human being? 23GW 824Ib. 25Honneth Kampf um Anerkennung Das Prinzip Arbeit26HKampf

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233Citation: Ricci V. Is there a struggle for recognition? In comparing Hegel and Honneth. Art Human Open Acc J. 2020;4(6):228234. DOI: 10.15406/ahoaj.2020.04.00174 recognition involves no struggle but a natural becoming of human being, a human basic dynamics which lets individuals overcome the state of nature (Naturzustand Anerkanntseyn); the struggle is solicited and engaged juridical according to its active aspect requiring interpersonal relation, that is not only from person to person or from individual to individual, dimension requiring other factors and components, but also and previously from person to things as possession, ownership, legacy being recognized is what constitutes the human being in its own spiritual essence that has still to appropriately develop itself, although it inevitably remains in a mostly immediate sphere until its end, as far so it will be mediated (Ungleich)28 between two ego with the consequence of producing an extraneity in each one of the two until creating an extreme situation as consciousnessfl(alsBewußtseyn) own (death), to suicidefl ( auf seineneigenen , Selbstmord ),appears (erscheint 29 Such a phenomenological happening with features of lethal risk so to provoke an intuitive immediate reaction, is the spring for establishing extraneity be discovered in its true value as ground of own free Self,30 because the conscious ego (or one of the two extremes) in schaut also sein aufgehobnesaüsserlichesDaseyn an),31 namely that exteriority-extraneity of this being-there has no effective validity, is in itself linked to the will, is formed, namely something properly ‚cultural™ of the same knowledge,32 A transformation or appropriation of this type, due to the recognising, implies necessarily a struggle, but not a struggle provoked by a social interest or wish or exigence, or worse some impulsiveness struggle is an exclusively extreme and extrimistic happening, that of GW 8 (Anerkanntseynist das geistige Element; aber noch unbestimmt in sich, und daher erfüllt mit mannichfachem Inhalte)28GW 8 29The mention of consciousness is an eloquent signal of the fact that this interior entity may not be evaluated metaphysically, indeed soon it is not any 30GW 8 (mitdemAnerkennen, mithihnenalsfreyemSelbst ), unlike the love (Liebe) capable to produce only a unity of both extremes as 31GW 8 En passant, Hegel seems retrieving a phenomenological content and process, which appeared till now nearly completely forgotten and occulted within the subliminal level of his soul, as well as the phenomenon of antithesis and duality of master-slave, just laconically mentioned in a marginal note (GW 832GW 8 Jenes Erkennen wird anerkennenthe recognitive process and the consequent freedom, to conquer the fundamental dimension already interiorly possessed but still unknown essential acquisition of what really matters, the pure Self seen in the other one,33 considering that this purity of will is explained on basis of the knowing qualifying both wills belonging to the two extremes [viz. the other extreme] is a knowing of the will ( einWissen desWillen )fl, situation representing the outcome of the above-mentioned struggle knowing one ( wissender pure unity, without impulse (d. h. in sichvollkommen in seine reine 34For Hegel, however, the recognition remains something essentially original, pre-social, although it reverberates itself in other higher anthropological spheres with other modulations and meanings; and perhaps simply his conception of ethical life ( Sittlichkeit)35 does not coincide with Honneth™s social idea or theory, as he himself somehow senses in the end of his interpretation, but not because Hegel changes is the base of building an ethical universality corresponding to a constitution of state, an objectivity in which each individual sees and participation in inter subjective sense, but something radically deeper, his entire true essence and existence, even if crossing necessarily primitive essential essence is inadequately encapsulated, enclosed in Phenomenology of Spirit, will understand the impossibility of such a perspective over recognition™s phenomenon, that is to belong exclusively to consciousness™ sphere, precisely self-consciousness™ sphere in which gained, entirely performed, but in view of achieving human (limited, phenomenological) rationality, despite the predictable ulterior effect universal self-consciousness, the third and last phenomenological stage of self-consciousness™ evolution which is still unavailable to him Some conclusive impressions The struggle for recognition seems to be a hypertrophic inconsistent imagination in itself; the social or merely human recognition results to be an immediate, undeniable conditio sine quanon, the same 33GW 8 (not for something) (struggle) it emerges [so] that the other one is seen as pure Selffl ( Die Bewegungist der Kampf auf Leben und Tod. Aus diesem geht jedes hervor, daß es das andre als reines Selbst gesehen 34GW 835 seems to put apart the noun Sittlichkeit after the attempt of its theoretical approach in Das System der Sittlichkeit reappears as a species of apax legomenon in one passage in the last writing on Realphilosophie (GW 8 person Sittlichkeit) in general, but Sittlichkeit to the right is

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