pdf. 12. Field, C. B. et al., 2014. ‘Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and. Vulnerability: Summary for Policymakers
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2INTRODUCTIONKennette Benedict Senior Advisor, Bulletin of Atomic ScientistsAngela Kane Senior Fellow, Vienna Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation; visiting Professor, Sciences Po Paris; former High Representative for Disarmament Joana Castro Pereira Postdoctoral Researcher at Portuguese Institute of International Relations, Philip Osano InstituteDavid Heymann Tropical Medicine Stephen Sparks Ariel Conn Founder and President, Magnitude 10 ConsultingCONTRIBUTORSANNUAL REPORT TEAMGLOBAL CHALLENGES FOUNDATION (GCF) ANNUAL REPORT: GCF & THOUGHT LEADERS SHARING WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ON GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC RISKS 2020 Ulrika Westin, editor-in-chief researcherVictoria Wariaro, coordinatorWeber Shandwick
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3Foreword 4Taxonomy 6Weapons of mass destruction 7Nuclear warfare 8Biological and chemical warfare 12 Catastrophic climate change 16 Ecological collapse 25 Pandemics 31 Asteroid impact 37 Supervolcanic eruption 41Arti˜cial intelligence 45 Endnotes 50Contents
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4In 2020, COVID-19 catapulted catastrophic risks and their governance into the global consciousness. The warning signs have been increasingly strong as humans disrupt biodiversity, come into close contact with virus-carrying creatures and travel intensively throughout the world. The Global Challenges Foundation™s Annual Report aims to give an overview of all the greatest threats to humanity, to track developments in the issues, to highlight their interconnectedness and to explore how they are being managed at the global level. The essays illustrate, more than ever, the complex linkages between these global risks and how they can reinforce each other. This year’s survey of global catastrophic risks comes with added signi˜cance. As in previous years, we are honored to have collaborated with Professor David Heymann of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine who has reviewed the chapter on catastrophic pandemics, bringing it up to date with a section on COVID-19. If ever there were an argument for enhanced global cooperation to tackle catastrophic risks, COVID-19 is it. The pandemic respects no borders and underlines our interdependency. No one is truly safe until everyone is protected Œ which means vaccines and treatment must reach everyone, a massive collective undertaking. But what of other pressing risks, notably the climate crisis which ˜nally and belatedly topped the global agenda last year but has since been largely overshadowed by the race to contain the virus? The pandemic will likely lead to a reduction in global carbon emissions in 2020. But how could it a˚ect climate change in the medium to long-term? There is of course a serious risk that political and public attention for climate issues will dramatically decline in the face of the acute economic and social consequences of the pandemic. And yet some of us believe that this crisis can be a turning point, giving rise to a greener future as the economic recovery packages being prepared by many countries o˚er an opportunity to re-build economies and societies towards sustainable modes of production and consumption. As debates continue about the best way to manage the greatest threats to our species™ existence, one thing is certain: we will need to build new forms of global governance, more urgently and more creatively than ever envisioned. The Global Challenges Foundation will continue to promote understanding and joined-up thinking about how we manage and govern these threats. We will be feeding into ongoing global discussions on these themes. As the United Nations marks its 75th anniversary this year, at a time of great disruption for the world, UN Secretary-General António Guterres has launched the ‚UN 75™ initiative. It promises to be the largest and most far-reaching global conversation to date on fiThe future we want Œ the UN we needfl. We are contributing to this debate by supporting the UN and the important work of one of the teams that won our 2017 ‚New Shape Prize™ to remodel global governance for the 21st century. This multinational team of experts – economist Augusto Lopez Claros, scientist Arthur Dahl and international lawyer Maja Gro˚ – is examining the key structural changes needed for the UN to e˚ectively address the greatest challenges of our time. They are developing an integrated set of proposals to review the UN Charter which would aim to give the UN the binding legislative, judicial and enforcement functions to e˚ectively address catastrophic risks, while still reserving most functions to states. Dear reader, FOREWORD
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5JENS ORBACK As well as UN reform, GCF is speci˜cally addressing climate governance by setting up a Climate Governance Commission. The Commission will diagnose obstacles to e˚ective climate action and propose global governance responses. It aims to develop and mobilise support for a number of proposals for the improvement of global decision- making and cooperation to stimulate e˚ective solutions to the climate crisis. The Commission will include expertise not only from climate experts, but also from experts on economics, the social sciences, global governance, public policy, diplomacy, business and the labor market. The aim is to kick-start progress in the failing international process to end catastrophic climate changes. We hope you ˜nd this report thought-provoking as a summary of the latest evidence on the risks we face. We are sincerely grateful to all the scientists and experts who have helped us – and who continue to help us – in ful˜lling our mission. This is an urgent global discussion that must accelerate from here. We invited these respected experts to inform and explain the risks as a catalyst for a more intensive and urgent global discussion. As we continue to support research and policy development, we welcome your feedback and contributions. Thank you. If ever there were an argument for enhanced global cooperation to tackle catastrophic risks, COVID-19 is it. FOREWORD
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6Global Catastrophic Risks 2020Taxonomy This report aims to present an overview of the global catastrophic risks that the world currently faces, based on consideration of certain crucial facts and the latest scienti˜c research. It proposes to complement the World Economic Forum™s Global Risks Report 1, which o˚ers an up-to-date picture of global risks as perceived by leading political and economic actors. These two approaches are highly complementary: perception is a strong driver of collective action and decision-making, while a more focused examination of the risks themselves will guide better long-term strategy and support the design of more e˛cient governance models. When preparing this report, we aimed to develop a taxonomy that would re˝ect the best current under -standing and be useful to decision-makers. We combined historical evidence and scienti˜c data to decide which risks should be included in the report. For the sake of clarity, we identi˜ed ten key risks, which we then organised into three main categories: current risks from human action, natural catastro -phes, and emerging risks. The reader should keep in mind, however, that many of those risks are closely interconnected, and their boundaries sometimes blur, as with climate change and ecological collapse, or as in the case of synthetic biology, which could be presented as a risk of its own, an additional risk factor in biological warfare, or a potential cause for engineered pandemics. The report o˚ers a description of the current risks, exploring what is at stake, what is known, and key factors a˚ecting risk levels. Then, for each risk, the report considers current governance frameworks for mitigating the risks. Each section was prepared in collaboration with leading experts in the ˜eld. CURRENT RISKS FROM HUMAN ACTIONWeapons of mass destruction Œ nuclear, climate change and ecological collapse are all NATURAL CATASTROPHESPandemics, asteroid impacts and supervolcanic EMERGING RISKS the case of climate change Œ has increased the are devoted to further the potential of those into mapping and managing the new dangers 2
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8HOW MUCH DO WE KNOW? Depending on their yield, technical characteristics and mode of explosion, today™s more powerful nuclear weapons will cause 80 to 95 per cent fatalities within a radius of 1 to 4 kilometres from their point of detonation, with very severe damage being felt for up to six times as far 5. The largest arsenals are currently held by the United States and Russia who control approximately 6,500 warheads each 6. Seven other states are known to possess nuclear weapons or are widely believed to possess them: the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel 7. Various scenarios of intentional use are currently imaginable but nuclear weapons could also be released by accident, triggering an inadvertent nuclear war Œ as has almost happened a number of times since 1945 8. In addition to their destructive e˚ect at the point of impact, nuclear explosions may cause what is known as a ‚nuclear winter™ 9, where clouds of dust and sulphates released by burning materials obscure the sun and cool the planet for months or years. According to one model, an all-out exchange of 4,000 nuclear weapons, in addition to the enormous loss of lives and cities, would release 150 teragrams of smoke, leading to an 8 degree drop in global temperature for a period of four to ˜ve years 10, during which time growing food would be extremely di˛cult. This would likely initiate a period of chaos and violence, during which most of the surviving world population would die from hunger. KENNETTE BENEDICTCredit/source: Unsplash Nuclear warfare
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WHAT ARE THE KEY FACTORS AFFECTING RISK LEVELS? Continued e˚orts towards arsenal reduction will reduce the overall level of nuclear risk. Attention to geopolitical tensions and rising nationalism, along with continued e˚orts towards global con˝ict management, particularly among nuclear states, will reduce the underlying risk of an intentional nuclear war 11. In addition, controlling and limiting horizontal proliferation 12 will limit the number of potential nuclear con˝ict scenarios and is highly likely to reduce the overall risk level. The risk of accidental use depends largely on the systems in place to launch missiles and the growing threats of cyberattacks on command and control systems. Hundreds of nuclear weapons are currently in a state of high readiness and could be released within minutes of an order 13. Building in longer decision-making time and broader consultation would reduce the risk of unauthorised launches or accidental launches based on misperception or false alarms. Increased awareness and understanding of the grave e˚ects that nuclear weapons have on human life, economic infrastructure, governance, social order and the global climate would motivate e˚orts to avoid such catastrophic harm to our societies 14.
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10States currently manage the risks of nuclear weapons through a range of measures that have prevented the worldwide spread of these weapons of mass destruction but have not signi˜cantly reduced the risk of catastrophic use. In fact, recent changes to nuclear doctrine and planned development of new nuclear weapons by the United States and Russia make it more likely that nuclear weapons will be used in military actions, or through miscalculation or accident, than at any time since the 1950s and the beginning of the Cold War. The pillar of nuclear military strategy is deterrence, whereby nuclear-armed states threaten to retaliate against other states™ use of nuclear weapons against them. This doctrine is considered by some to be an e˚ective way of preventing nuclear war. The fact that no nuclear weapons have been used in any con˝ict since 1945, however, suggests that political restraint and a moral norm also may have played a role in discouraging their use. As major powers relied on deterrence in their military doctrines, however, international cooperation, beginning with the 1963 US- Soviet treaty to ban atmospheric testing, along with subsequent US-Soviet/Russian bilateral treaties and agreements, has reduced and stabilised nuclear arsenals from a high of 68,000 in the late 1980s to about 14,000 today. In addition, the 1970 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) has prevented the development of nuclear weapons in all countries beyond the original ˜ve (United States, Soviet Union/Russia, United Kingdom, France and China) with the exception of India, Pakistan, North Korea and probably Israel. Altogether, some 25 governments have given up their nuclear weapons programmes, including South Africa, Libya, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Another 15, like Canada, Brazil and Argentina, have contemplated programmes but not embarked on them, in keeping with their responsibilities under the NPT. The UN Security Council, whose permanent members include the ˜ve recognised nuclear weapons states, enforces the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in partnership with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Although the IAEA was established primarily to promote and oversee the development of civilian nuclear power, it is entrusted with verifying adherence to the Treaty (under Article III). Parties to the Treaty regularly report to the IAEA about the means used to safeguard and secure enriched uranium and plutonium used in civilian power plants, as well as steps to prevent the use of nuclear materials for bombs. Governance of nuclear warfare Kennette Benedict , Senior Advisor, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists The pillar of nuclear military strategy is deterrence, whereby nuclear-armed states threaten to retaliate against other states™ use of nuclear weapons against them. 68,000 In the late 1980s Today 14,000
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11NUCLEAR WARFARESeveral states have not complied with their Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty obligations and faced penalties from the international community. Iraq embarked on a nuclear weapons programme, but, after nuclear bomb technology was discovered in 1991, the weapons were destroyed by a special UN Security Council-mandated force. In the case of Iran, international economic sanctions were applied when suspicions arose about its possible pursuit of nuclear weapons. To prevent Iran from acquiring them, multilateral negotiations produced the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. It mandated reduction of the means to enrich uranium to a minimal level, allowing enrichment only to below weapons-grade. It also ensured continuous IAEA monitoring of Iran™s civilian nuclear programme. As part of an unravelling of nuclear governance, however, the United States has pulled out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action and Iran has increased production of enriched uranium beyond that stipulated in the agreement. Even more consequential, the United States has announced its abrogation of the 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with Russia that banned a class of missiles with nuclear weapons capability. In addition, the United States has not yet announced its interest in working with Russia to extend the 2010 New START, an agreement that places a cap on American and Russian arsenals with provisions for robust inspections. Russia and the United States have each declared their intentions to use nuclear weapons, even if nuclear weapons are not used against them ˜rst. These actions, along with North Korea™s continued production of nuclear weapons, despite international economic sanctions, suggest that the norms of restraint may not be as strong as in the past. In fact, a new nuclear arms race is under way among all of the nuclear weapons states that reinforces the utility of nuclear weapons in war- ˜ghting and increases the risk that these weapons will be used. This new arms race underscores the di˛culties of enforcing the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty when countries do not wish to cooperate. The original treaty suggested a bargain whereby states without nuclear weapons would not acquire them but would have access to civilian nuclear power. In exchange, the states with nuclear weapons pledged to disarm when conditions warranted. Many believed that the end of the Cold War was such a time, and yet, while nuclear arsenals have radically decreased in Russia and the United States, the recent reversal in doctrine and rhetoric suggest that these and other nuclear weapons states have no intention at present of eliminating their nuclear arsenals. Even as formal treaties and informal norms of restraint are eroding, however, non-nuclear weapons states have introduced a UN treaty banning all nuclear weapons. One hundred and thirty-˜ve of the 193 member countries participated in the 2017 UN treaty negotiations; 122 countries voted in favour of the ˜nal treaty, one against and one country abstained. As of December 2019, 80 countries have signed the treaty and 34 have rati˜ed it, adapting their national legislation to comply with its provisions. The treaty, which is inde˜nitely open for signing, will take e˚ect when 50 nations have rati˜ed it. Not since the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty of 1970 have states taken such dramatic and collective action to prohibit possession of nuclear arsenals Unfortunately, re-emerging nationalism is spurring the nine nuclear weapons states Œ none of which participated in or voted on the UN ban treaty Œ to modernise, increase and lower the threshold to use their nuclear weapons. Such actions reinforce beliefs about the purported utility of nuclear weapons, undermine international cooperative e˚orts to reduce the risks and seriously increase the probability of catastrophic nuclear war.
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