Jun 27, 2013 — *Ram configurations can consist of a combination of blind/shear ram, non-sealing casing ram, and pipe ram preventers. This document is the final
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BLOWOUT PREVENTER (BOP)MAINTENANCE AND INSPECTION STUDY FINAL REPORT FOR THE BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT2650788-FRRecReg-FR-G 2 Final Report for Issue to BSEE 6/27/13 2650788-FRRecReg-FR-G 1 Issued as Draft to BSEE and for Industry Participant review 4/30/13 Report No. Revision Purpose of Revision Date June 2013 This work was performed by the American Bureau of Shipping and ABSG Consulting Inc. for the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) under the terms of BSEE contract number M11PC00027.

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SUMMARY As part of the Blowout Preventer (BOP) Maintena nce and Inspection for Deepwater Operations study (BSEE contract number M11PC00027), the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) and ABSG Consulting Inc. (ABS Consulting) compiled and an alyzed data and information related to BOP system failure events and maintenance, inspection, and test (MIT) activities. This report represents Deliverable G associated with Tasks 6.3.1, 6.3.2 and 6.3.3, as outlined in the contract. The scope of this study included BOP systems, associated control systems, and components meeting the following criteria: Operation Location Œ Gulf of Mexico (GoM) Operating Depth Œ 5000 feet and deeper BOP Configurations: oClass VI BOP , five ram configuration and single annular or a four ram and dual annular* oClass VII BOP , five ram configuration and dual annular or a six ram and single annular* oClass VIII BOP , six ram configuration and dual annular* *Ram configurations can consist of a combination of blind/shear ram, non-sealing casing ram, and pipe ram preventers. This document is the final report culminating from a number of deliverables developed during the study. The final report provides highlights derived from the other documents and seeks to summarize key findings and conclusions. If additional information is sought in any of the areas addressed in this document, the reader will find additional detail and supporting information in those documents. The final report contains the following sections: Section 1 of this report provides the study objectives, scope, and describes the report organization in more detail. Section 2 of the report provides an overview of the study phases and activities. In addition, this section summarizes various analyses. Specifically, this study included: Failure and Maintenance Data Analysis Œ This effort involved the collection and analysis of the failure event and maintenance task data from 23 rigs. Specifically, the data analysis included more than 430 failure events and 88,000 maintenance task activity records. This analysis results included failure and maintenance event trends and estimation of BOP and subsystem mean time to failure (MTTF) values. Failure Mode, Effect, and Critical Analyses (FMECAs) Œ Three teams including representatives from one of the BOP origin al equipment manufacturers (OEMs), drilling contractor, and operator performed a FMECA on a selected rig. The FMECAs associated equipment-level failure modes to BOP functions, aligned key MIT activities to the equipment-level failure modes, and assessed the risk of equipment-level failure modes. The v

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FMECA results help identify the more important equipment-level failures and maintenance activities. Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability (RAM) Studies Œ Two RAM studies were performed with each study being based on a typical configuration for one of the BOP OEM™s design. These studies provide an estimate of the key reliability factor of merit, mean availability1. These results provide an estimation of the probability of BOP being operational to control a well kick. The results indicate the mean availability (while the BOP is latched on to a well) is between 98.7% and 99.0% depending on the BOP design and the assumed functions required to control the well. These studies also evaluated the impact of selected equipment improvements, as well as changes in test frequency. MIT Activities and MIT Management System Survey Œ This effort included a review and comparison of BOP MIT tasks (1) required by various regulation and industry standards/recommended practices and (2) contained in the MIT plans developed by drilling contractors. In addition, this effort included a survey of management systems and practices related to BOP maintenance activities. As expected, these results indicate API 53 is the key document in defining the minimum MIT tasks for BOP. In addition, the drilling contractor MIT plans and BOP OEM installation, operation, and maintenance (IOM) manuals include tasks addressing API 53 requirements and many other BOP maintenance activities. The management system survey results indicate ma ny good practices are in place relative failure elimination, computerized maintenance management system (CMMS), overall maintenance management systems, preventive maintenance (PM) program, written instructions, and training. Section 3 of this report provides a roadmap (by report) of key study results. In addition, each of the above-mentioned analyses generated findings, whic h identify potential improvement areas to be considered. In total, the analyses generated 21 findings and 8 observations. Some the key findings are as follows: Based on the failure event data, the top contributors to BOP failures were found to be: oBlue & Yellow Subsea Control System oMUX Control System oPipe & Test Rams oConnectors* oChoke & Kill Valves and Lines *The fiConnectorfl category contains all subsea connectors, including the wellhead and LMRP connectors, and other connectors such as stabs an d wet mate connectors. If the connectors are subdivided, the wellhead, LMRP, and riser connector s account for 3% of the BOP system failures. The mean availability is the proportion of time during a missi on or time that the system is available for use. (source: http://www.weibull.com/hotwire/issue79/relbasics79.htm ) vi 1

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The management system survey indicated that PM intervals are primarily established based on OEM recommendations. The management system survey indicated that training of BOP maintainers after initial training (i.e., periodic or refresher training) is limited Section 4 of this report contains recommenda tions for addressing the analyses findings and observations outlined in Section 3. These recomm endations were developed in collaboration with industry participants (IPs). The study genera ted the following 7 recommendations. (Note: Recommendations have not been vetted with the IP s and therefore are subject to change, including the generation of additional recommendations.) 1.Consider developing an industry document defining guidelines for recording and collecting BOP component failure data. Consider addressing : Component taxonomy Component failure codes Relevant operating parameters (e.g., BOP days, operating cycles) needed 2.Consider developing an industry guideline or recommended practice for performing BOP reliability analyses. Consider addressing the following issues: Definition of BOP failure Reliability factors of merit of interest for all key stakeholders (e.g., drilling contractors, operators, regulators) Reliability modeling approaches to be used for the differing factors of merit Consideration of common cause failures in the quantitative models 3.Consider conducting additional industry studies to investigate the application and expanded use of predictive maintenance techniques to BOP maintenance, including the evaluation of common predictive tools used by other industries for possible application to BOP systems and the identification of any new predictive maintenance technologies needed for BOP maintenance applications. 4.Consider piloting the use of reliability and/or risk-based analytical approaches, such as reliability-centered maintenance (RCM) and risk-based inspection (RBI), for evaluating and determining BOP MIT tasks. 5.Consider conducting a more extensive survey of reliability and maintenance management system practices used for BOP maintenance. Th e results of such a survey may be useful in identifying effective BOP management best practices. 6.Consider developing a guidance document related to key performance indicators, which could be used to monitor the performance and maintenance of BOPs. Consider including both leading and lagging indicators. viii

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7.Consider conducting additional, more detailed studies to investigate the best means to improve failure management strategies for the higher risk components and harder to detect failure modes identified in the FMECAs. In conclusion, BSEE™s overall objective for this study was to generate and provide information related to the maintenance and inspection of BOPs operating in deepwater in the GoM. To this end, this study generated nine reports containing the following information: Estimation of BOP performance in terms of MTTF and mean availability Trending of actual BOP equipment failures and failure modes Review of planned and actual performed MIT tasks Alignment of MIT tasks with potential BOP equipment failures Identification of BOP equipment risks Comparison of MIT task requirements containe d in regulations and industry standards/ recommended practices Survey of reliability and maintenance management systems related to BOP maintenance ix

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Section PageSUMMARY vLIST OF TABLES .xiii LIST OF ACRONYMS xv 1.0 INTRODUCTION .. 11.1 Objectives 11.2 Scope .. 11.3 Study Approach 21.3.1 Phase I: Data Collection, Compilation, and Analysis 31.3.2 Phase II: Risk and Reliability Analyses and Management Systems and Technology Review 31.4 Study Reports . 51.5 Report Organization 62.0 STUDY ANALYSES OVERVIEW ..72.1 Data Analysis . 72.2 FMECAs .. 92.3 Reliability, Availability, and Main tainability (RAM) Studies 102.4 MIT Activities and MIT Management System Survey .. 143.0 STUDY RESULTS .. 173.1 Key Results Roadmap . 173.2 Analyses Findings . 193.3 Analyses Observations 264.0 RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS .31xi

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