29 US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, September 30, 2001, archive.defense/pubs/qdr2001.pdf. 30 Carnegie Endowment for
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The China Plan: A Transatlantic Blueprint for Strategic CompetitionLead Authors Hans BinnendijkSarah KirchbergerProject DirectorConnor McPartland Study and Editorial DirectorChristopher SkalubaContributing Authors James P. Danoy Franklin D. Kramer Clementine G. Starling Didi Kirsten Tatlow
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The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world. The Center honors General Brent Scowcroft™s legacy of service and embodies his ethos of nonpartisan commitment to the cause of security, support for US leadership in cooperation with allies and partners, and dedication to the mentorship of the next generation of leaders. The Scowcroft Center™s Transatlantic Security Initiative brings together top policymakers, government and military o˜cials, business leaders, and experts from Europe and North America to share insights, strengthen cooperation, and develop innovative approaches to the key challenges facing NATO and the transatlantic community. This report was produced under the auspices of a project conducted in partnership with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign A˚airs focused on the impact of China on the transatlantic relationship.
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ISBN-13: 978-1-61977-165-9This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence. The au -thors are solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report™s conclusions. March 2021The China Plan: A Transatlantic Blueprint for Strategic CompetitionLead Authors Hans BinnendijkSarah KirchbergerProject DirectorConnor McPartland Study and Editorial DirectorChristopher SkalubaContributing Authors James P. Danoy Franklin D. Kramer Clementine G. Starling Didi Kirsten Tatlow
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IITable of Contents Executive Summary and Principal Recommendations 1Introduction 6Chapter I: Assessing the Problem 8 Section A: China™s Strategic Goals and Policies 8 Section B: US Policies and Approaches 11 Section C: European Policies and Approaches 14 Section D: Public Attitudes Towards China 19 Section E: Potential Outcomes 21Chapter II: Areas of Greatest Potential Convergence 24 Section A: China™s Malign Governance and Human Rights Practices 24 Section B: Chinese Diplomacy and Interference Operations Abroad 38Chapter III: Areas of Lesser Initial Convergence 50 Section A: Economic Challenges 50 Section B: Technology and Cyber Competition 61Chapter IV: Security as an Area of Asymmetric Interests 72 Section A: Growing Chinese Military Capabilities 72 Section B: Enhanced Sino-Russian Security Cooperation 77 Section C: Potential for Confrontation in the Indo-Paci˛c Region 80 Section D: Military and Security Challenges in the European Area 84Chapter V: Toward a Transatlantic Blueprint 88 Section A: Organizing for Policy Coordination 88 Section B: Aligning Intelligence Assessments 89 Section C: Bringing in Asian Allies 91 Section D: Areas for Cooperation with ChinaŠfiOne Worldfl Challenges 93About the Authors 97Acknowledgements 100
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1Executive Summary and Principal Recommendations 1 Laura Silver, Kat Devlin, and Christine Huang, Americans Fault China for Its Role in the Spread of COVID-19, Pew Research Center, July 30, 2020, https:// www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/07/30/americans-fault-china-for-its-role-in-the-spread-of-covid-19/. China presents the United States and its partners with the most serious set of challenges they have faced since the Cold War. The scope of those chal -lenges is global. Their potential impact is deep. Left unaddressed, they will harm the fundamental, vital in -terests of democratic nations everywhere. Collective action between the United States and its European partners, co -ordinated with like-minded nations in Asia, is needed to de -˝ect these challenges, protect our vital interests, and seek a change in China™s policies. Several strategies have been o˚ered to manage China. What is missing is a blueprintŠa fiChina PlanflŠto guide the United States and its partners in this endeavor. This study represents such a blueprint. Conducted over the course of a year and drawing on the research and opinions of hundreds of experts, policy mak -ers, and academics in the United States, Europe, and Asia, this study delves into three broad trends and analyzes ˛ve major areas in which Chinese actions threaten transatlan-tic interests: human rights, coercive diplomacy, predatory economic practices, technology competition, and security challenges.In doing so, this study identi˛es areas of convergence, di -vergence, and asymmetry in transatlantic attitudes towards China, arguing forcibly that a transatlantic response is ur-gent and necessary to prevent China from remaking the rules-based order to its singular advantage. It concludes with ten recommended steps for minimizing divergences as a means to building a coordinated transatlantic blue-print for confronting, competing with, and, where possible, cooperating with China. Three De˜ning Trends Three major developing trends together provide both an opportunity and a requirement for transatlantic nations to make a concerted e˚ort to promote and protect their inter -ests in the face of a broad spectrum of assertive Chinese policies. China™s increased assertiveness in its international relations combined with bipartisan consensus about the threat China poses in the United States and growing dis -content with harmful Chinese behavior in Europe create an environment ripe for closer collaboration among transatlan-tic nations. These three trends are discussed in Chapter I. 1. Xi™s China has become more authoritarian, out -ward-facing, and assertive in promoting Chinese interests.Under Chinese President Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has taken a more dominant po -sition in governance in China, the economy has become more state-driven, and Western liberal values have been explicitly disavowed. Externally, Deng Xiaoping™s tradi -tional admonition to fibide one™s time and hide one™s light,fl lest the outside world gang up on a rising China, has been given up in favor of a more assertive, at times aggressively coercive, outward approach. China™s economic strengths give it a strong platform on which to base its international actions. But beyond economics and trade, the CCP™s do -mestic insecurities are now projected outward, be it in the form of bolstering the leadership of autocratic nations by exporting surveillance and control technologies, in˛ltrat -ing the leadership structures of international organizations with party-state representatives, attempting to control public discourse within democratic countries where it re -lates to Chinese interests, or aligning China closer with Russia, Iran, and other powerful nondemocratic coun-tries. Heightened military threats to Taiwan, India, Japan, Vietnam, and to virtually all the rival claimants in China™s maritime territorial disputes are yet another aspect of this shift in policy. As a result, the risk of open con˝ict in Asia involving China has increased during this past year. 2. Bipartisan consensus in the United States provides a strong foundation for policy. In the United States, there is now bipartisan agreement that the best way to deal with China is to confront it in a uni-˛ed manner with global partners. A recent Pew Research Center poll found that 73 percent of Americans expressed an unfavorable view of China.1 The Trump administration pursued erratic unilateral e˚orts with respect to challen-ging China until late in its tenure, leaving many European partners alienated and unwilling to pursue united actions in concert with Washington. US President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., has indicated he will challenge China similarly to the Trump administration, but with a di˚erent style and emp -hasis. Biden has said he will focus on international rules of the road and be extremely competitive, but seek to avoid
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2con˝ict. Members of his new administration have already criticized China™s economic and human rights policies, and a representative of Taiwan was invited to Biden™s in -auguration. In his ˛rst phone call with Xi on February 10, Biden criticized China for its coercive and unfair economic practices, human rights abuses, and increasingly assertive actions in Asia. Biden has continued vigorous Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea and US Naval transits of the Taiwan Strait. At the same time, he has mentioned pursuing practical, results-oriented enga -gements with China when it is in US and allied interests. Coordinating policies with allies and partners is a center-piece of Biden™s foreign policy agenda. 3. European leaders have grown more skeptical of China, paving the way for strengthened transatlantic cooperation.Many European leaders have recently done an about face and become more concerned about Chinese policies, is-suing unprecedented critical remarks including a call for greater unity among democratic nations to manage a rising China. European Union (EU) High Representative Josep Borrell believes that fithe West was naive with regard to China,fl while NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has stated: fiIn a world of greater global competition, where we see China coming closer to us from the Arctic to cyber space, NATO needs a more global approach.fl 2 Numerous national and EU leaders have voiced similar concerns. France and the United Kingdom in particular have indi-cated their strong opposition to China™s human rights abuses and attempts to restrict the freedom of navigation. Germany has been less forceful, but it has consistently of-fered safe harbor to Chinese dissidents. Sweden has gone farthest in its e˚orts to curb authoritarian in˝uences by ter-minating all Confucius Institutes and city partnership pro -grams. Some countries that had previously joined China™s 17+1, such as Lithuania and the Czech Republic, have re -cently intensi˛ed their contacts with Taiwan, indicating a weakening of that framework. Several European nations are backing away from using Huawei 5G communications infrastructure while others such as Germany seem to be hedging their bets. On the other hand, many European countries still maintain strong ties to China, and some, like Greece and Hungary, have blocked statements by the EU condemning China™s human rights record. In general, how -ever, European nations will be inclined to cooperate with the Biden administration.˙In December 2020, the EU and China concluded in principle the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on 2 Josep Borrell, fiChina, the United States and us,fl European External Action Service, July 31, 2020, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters- homepage/83644/china-united-states-and-us_en; NATO, fiRemarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on launching #NATO2030 – Strengthening the Alliance in an increasingly competitive world,fl June 8, 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_176197.htm. Investment (CAI), which is designed to level the investment playing ˛eld. As with the US Phase One trade agreement with China, the CAI was concluded without close transat -lantic consultation. China may feel that reaching this agree-ment with the EU will undercut this building consensus for a comprehensive transatlantic approach to confronting China. The EU must now prove China wrong. This modest agreement should not serve as an excuse for European backpedaling on transatlantic cooperation.Speed is thus important in developing a consolidated transatlantic strategy. The United States™ democratic part -ners want to stop China™s malign activities without start -ing another Cold War or severing all ties with China. They are increasingly ready to join forces to better de˛ne and defend their common interests with the United States. Success, however, requires working in a spirit of partner -ship that is not unilaterally dictated by Washington. A Blueprint for Transatlantic Cooperation This study provides the following blueprint for the Biden administration as it engages with its European and Asian partners in addressing China. It includes the following eight steps, each of which is elaborated below:i. Create a new transatlantic coordinating mechanism on China.ii. Develop a common transatlantic intelligence picture of Chinese strategic intentions.iii. Design common transatlantic goals for addressing China.iv. Based upon those goals, construct a common trans-atlantic strategic approach to China which combines rivalry, competition, and cooperation. v. Design speci˛c initiatives in areas of transatlan-tic convergence to counter aggressive Chinese behavior. vi. Manage approaches to China in areas of transatlan-tic divergence and asymmetry, reducing di˚erences wherever possible. vii. Cooperate with China in areas of global common interest while verifying Chinese compliance. viii. Coordinate each step with partners in Asia.
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4They must insist on veri˛able Chinese actions rather than idle promises that go unful˛lled.2. To organize for this e˜ort, the partners should create a fiTransatlantic Coordinating Council on Chinafl as the central forum for discussion and coordination among relevant actors on the multiple issues that China presents. Such a forum would include the member na-tions of both the EU and NATO, as well as the EU and NATO as entities. The establishment of a fiTransatlantic Coordinating Council on Chinafl would allow decision making that takes into account the full scope of the issues that China presents, including when decisions in one arena have rami˛cations for another. 3. To align transatlantic perspectives , the partners should develop a uni˜ed, comprehensive, and dy -namic ficommon intelligence picturefl of China™s stra -tegic direction. They should establish a consortium of national-level allied and partner intelligence services to cooperate on analytic and intelligence-gathering acti-vities on China.4. To develop common transatlantic goals , the partners should consider the following:i. minimizing transatlantic di˚erences as nations de-sign their policies toward Chinaii. protecting common transatlantic interests from the impact of malign Chinese economic, technological, and diplomatic practicesiii. upholding democratic and human rights valuesiv. deterring Chinese military practices that could lead to armed con˝ict v. convincing China™s leadership that it is in their best interest to operate in the current liberal interna-tional ordervi. cooperating with China where interests align in order to meet these goals5. To counter malign Chinese domestic human rights and autocratic practices, the partners should i. organize a concerted e˚ort, including using the proposed D-10 mechanism, to promote the value of democracy, human rights, and importance of good governance; ii. continue a staunch, multilateral push for indepen -dent investigation and fact-˛nding missions to China to investigate human rights violations, includ-ing through the EU and the United Nations Human Rights Council; iii. swiftly negate all extradition treaties with China or Hong Kong under the principle of non-refoulement. No other country should enter into further extradi -tion agreements with China; and iv. enact stringent legislation limiting exports of European and US technology to China that could be used for mass surveillance purposes, establish a monitoring system to enhance transparency along supply chains and introduce in-depth assessments of human rights risks, and introduce liability legisla -tion for companies that use supplies and suppliers where forced labor is a known risk.6. To counter coercive Chinese diplomacy, excessive intelligence gathering, and disinformation practices, the partners should i. respond collectively to any case of diplomatic bul -lying of one partner with a ficoercion against one is coercion against allfl policy; ii. reengage in international organizations to limit Chinese power; iii. create transatlantic rapid-response mechanisms to o˚set Chinese disinformation; and iv. register Chinese ficivil societyfl groups operating in the transatlantic space to limit intelligence gather-ing and in˝uence peddling.7. To counter predatory Chinese economic policies, the partners should i. exclude any Chinese products and services from supply chains vital to national security;ii. for non-strategic sectors unfairly a˚ected by China™s state-directed economic practices, establish frame-works to have selective o˚setting impact, including import restraints and tari˚s. For other commercial products and services to commercial users, sub-ject trade to the caveats that access to the US and European markets should depend on generally comparable access to China™s domestic market and that forced technology transfer should be barred;iii. work together to ensure that there are alternatives to China™s Huawei and ZTE by developing open-ar -chitecture 5G capabilities;
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5iv. create a˙resilience plan for all key critical˙infra -structure supply chains to avoid over-dependency on China, including having su˜cient non-Chinese companies in critical infrastructure supply chains so that China does not have a dominant position;v. develop a coordinated transatlantic approach to establishing resilient cybersecurity architectures to be utilized by businesses as a key element in pro -viding protection against Chinese cyber espionage; andvi. work together to provide investment and techni-cal assistance in sectors related to climate change, environment, health, and water as alternatives to Chinese sponsored action.˙8. To counter Chinese e˜orts to dominate global tech -nology, the partners should i. systematically educate industry and government stakeholders on the risks of covert technology transfers through regular business and research and development (R&D) exchanges with Chinese entities;ii. bolster R&D in strategic sectors and protect indus -tries from unfairly subsidized competition in domes-tic and global markets; iii. enhance US and allied presence in technology standard-setting bodies; andiv. block technology transfers to China that could fur -ther fuel China™s military buildup, even indirectly. 9. To counter China™s global and regional military chal -lenges, the partners should i. enhance Europe™s military capabilities so that Europe has e˚ective defenses should con˝ict in Asia divert US attention and forces; ii. enhance deterrence in Asia by clarifying to China that NATO allies would not stand by should China attack US forces in Asia;iii. commit through NATO to defend freedoms in the global commons;iv. prevent further Chinese strategic investments in NATO countries that would stall NATO decision making or mobilization during a crisis;v. organize NATO to give it maximum capability to deal with the challenges from China; andvi. form a fiNATO-China Councilfl similar to the NATO- Russia Council to engage with China to discuss se-curity issues. 10. These uni˜ed e˚orts need not be packaged in one set of comprehensive demands. The general transat-lantic strategy toward China should be a coordinated e˚ort to deter Chinese malign behavior where neces-sary and cooperate with China where possible, making sure that cooperation is implemented. These e˚orts are likely more manageable if approached in bite-si -zed chunks, allowing consensus among democratic nations to form around them. As speci˛c transatlantic initiatives emerge, they need to be balanced to ac -count for national priorities.
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6Introduction By Christopher Skaluba and Hans BinnendijkChina™s increasingly ambitious global reach is ani -mating debates about a new era of great-power competition and catapulting China to the top of the transatlantic and transpaci˛c political agen -das. Buoyed by rapid economic growth, rising nationalism, authoritarian governance, and a sense of national destiny, China is exhibiting growing con˛dence and in˝uence on the global stage. Through its provocative actions in the South China Sea, distortive economic policies, aggressive military and tech-nological investments, e˚orts to expand commercial and political leverage through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), cyber espionage and intelligence operations skilled at ap-propriating intellectual property, and an ability to project both hard and soft power into every region of the world, China is seeking to reshape the existing liberal international order and the Western-based institutions that underpin it. Understanding China™s grand strategy and transatlantic re -actions to it is necessary to understand the implications for the rules-based international order so painstakingly built by the transatlantic community over the last seventy years. Beijing is both bene˛tting from and challenging this system, looking to remake it in a manner more accommodating to its authoritarian political philosophy. Beijing™s political worl -dview, of course, is at odds with the democratic ideals tra -ditionally cherished by the Euro-Atlantic family and thus a source of tension between China on the one hand and the United States, Canada, and Europe on the other. The United States has clearly prioritized China as an economic and security challenge and it is the rare pol-icy issue to have achieved a degree of bipartisan con-sensus in Washington. Europe until recently has taken a more restrained approach, recognizing its dependence on Chinese markets and investments for the health of its economy, while unconcerned about China as a regional se -curity challenger. Chinese investments in Europe in areas as diverse as transport, utilities, infrastructure, real estate, ˛nancial services, biotech, and the automotive sector are important for some European economiesŠan uncomfort-able reality as European leaders awaken to the fact that Chinese investments have serious strategic implications and constitute political leverage over European govern-ments and institutions. While Europe on the whole still sees close partnership with the United States as paramount, it is occasionally caught between the United States and China on thorny issues. Recent debates regarding Huawei™s 5G technologies are illustrative as European governments struggle with the fact that access to China™s subsidized and advanced digital communications infrastructure comes with signi˛cant secu-rity risks to their own countries and are unacceptable to the United States. Even as Europe is awakening to the strategic implications of Chinese investments, the approach to China from governments across the Continent remains uneven.As a result of these developments, the Atlantic Council has initiated a series of papers on China that have been published during the past year. This is the seventh paper in that series. The others include:i. Franklin D. Kramer. Managed Competition: Meeting the China Challenge in a Multi-Vector World . December 2019. ii. Hans Binnendijk, Sarah Kirchberger, and Christopher Skaluba. Capitalizing on Transatlantic Concerns about China. August 2020. iii. Je˚rey Cimmino, Matthew Kroenig, and Barry Pavel. A Global Strategy for China. September 2020. iv. Franklin D. Kramer. Priorities for a Transatlantic China Strategy . November 2020. v. Je˚rey Cimmino and Matthew Kroenig. Global Strategy 2021: An Allied Strategy for China . December 2020. vi. Anonymous. The Longer Telegram: Toward a New American China Strategy . January 2021.Several compatible themes emerge from these papers.In Managed Competition, Kramer argues that the main el-ements of the United States™ China strategy should include enhancing US innovation, increasing resilience, particularly against Chinese cyber espionage, providing both assur -ance and deterrence, and establishing selective trade and economic limitations for strategic sectors vital to national security and sectors a˚ected by China™s predatory eco -nomic practices, all undertaken in coordination with the United States™ close allies and partners. The long-term goals of this strategy should be to: i) ensure modernization
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7for the United States and its close allies and partners, ii) constrain negative Chinese behavior, and iii) allow for co -operation on fione worldfl issues.In Capitalizing on Transatlantic Concerns about China , the authors recognize that under Chinese President Xi Jinping, China has shifted to a harder brand of authoritarianism and a more aggressive foreign and defense policy. China has a well-thought-out strategy to meet its goals, while the United States and its partners have no compatible strat -egy to counter China. However, th is shift in Chinese poli-cies under Xi has resulted in a growing common concern among transatlantic partners about Chinese behavior. The study suggests that this convergence could form the basis for a new transatlantic strategy on China. By devel -oping such a uni˛ed strategy and extending it to Asian partners, China would be dissuaded from implementing its often-successful divide and conquer policies. In a Global Strategy for China , the authors expand upon these two earlier studies by focusing on three key ele -ments of a US China strategy. Those elements include: i) strengthening like-minded allies and partners and the rules-based system for a new era of great-power competi-tion, ii) defending against Chinese behavior that threatens to undermine core principles of the rules-based system, and iii) engaging China from a position of strength to coop-erate on shared interests and, ultimately, incorporate China into a revitalized and adapted rules-based system.In Priorities for a Transatlantic China Strategy, Kramer pro-poses the establishment of a Transatlantic Coordinating Council to provide a central forum for discussion and co-ordination on the multiple issues that China presents. Such a forum would include the member nations of both the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as well as the EU and NATO as entities. The Longer Telegram argues that US strategy and policy toward China must be laser-focused on the fault lines among Xi and his inner circle, aimed at changing their ob -jectives and behavior and thus their strategic course. The anonymous author argues that Chinese Communist Party (CCP) elites are much more divided about Xi™s leadership and vast ambitions than is widely appreciated. The prin-cipal goal of US strategy, the paper argues, should be to cause China™s ruling elites to conclude that it is in China™s best interests to continue operating within the US-led li-beral international order rather than building a rival order, and that it is in the CCP™s best interests to not attempt to expand China™s borders or export its political model be -yond China™s shores. This paper builds on the previous six. It assesses Chinese behavior in ˛ve key areas where China™s challenge has become more malign and dangerous during the past year: human rights violations, coercive diplomatic practices, unfair trade and investment policies, technological en-trapment, and aggressive security measures. In reviewing these ˛ve areas, the study analyzes elements of transatlan-tic convergence, divergence, and asymmetry that can be used to design uni˛ed transatlantic approaches to China. Using this analysis, this paper presents a practical blueprint with speci˛c actionable recommendations for the Biden administration and European policy makers. The blueprint is designed to align transatlantic policies, coordinate those policies with Asian partners, protect common interests, and meet common goals. Like the other papers, it envisions confronting China where necessary and cooperating with China where possible, provided that China implements its agreements. Combined, these actions will provide a resil-ient capability on the part of the transatlantic nations to achieve their economic, security, and values objectives even in the face of negative Chinese actions. Moreover, the combined e˚ort might a˚ect internal Chinese politics and ultimately lead to modifying some of China™s policies as The Longer Telegram envisions. In developing this paper, a series of four major online con -ferences were held to gather views from the United States, Europe, and Asia. Perspectives from the dozens of partic -ipants in these four conferences have been incorporated into this paper. In addition, a core group of experts met with the principal authors on a biweekly basis to discuss issues, re˛ne arguments, and craft recommendations. Six members of this team each drafted signi˛cant sections of this report.
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