Jan 6, 2017 — The tradecraft standards for analytic products have been refined over the past ten years. These standards include describing sources
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1 Incident Attribution i ed version of a highly classified assessment that has been provided to the President and to recipients approved by the President. The Intelligence Community rarely can publicly reveal the full extent of its knowledge or the precise bases for its assessments, as the release of such information would reveal sensitive sources or methods and imperil the ability to collect critical foreign intelligence in the future. Thus, while the conclusions in the report are all reflected in the classified assessment, the declassified report does not and cannot include the full supporting information, including specific intelligence and sources and methods. The Analyti c Process The mission of the Intelligence Community is to seek to reduce the uncertainty surrounding foreign understand complex issues on which foreig n actors go to extraordinary lengths to hide or obfuscate their activities. On these issues of great importance to US national security, the goal of intelligence analysis is to provide assessments to decisionmakers that are intellectually rigorous, objec tive, timely, and useful, and that adhere to tradecraft standards. The tradecraft standards for analytic products have been refined over the past ten years. These standards include describing sources (including their reliability and access to the inform ation they judgments and assumptions, exploring alternatives, demonstrating relevance to the customer, using strong and transparent logic, and explaining change or consistency in judgments over time. Applying these standards helps ensure that the Intelligence Community provides US policymakers, warfighters, and operators with the best and most accurate insight, warning, and context, as well as potential o pportunities to advance US national security. Intelligence Community analysts integrate information from a wide range of sources, including human sources, technical collection, and open source information, and apply specialized skills and structured anal ytic tools to draw inferences informed by the data available, relevant past activity, and logic and reasoning to provide insight into what is happening and the prospects for the future. sociated with major judgments based on the quantity and quality of the source material, information gaps, and the complexity of the issue. conveying an analytic as sessment or judgment. Some analytic judgments are based directly on collected information; others rest on previous judgments, which serve as building blocks in rigorous analysis. In either type of judgment, the tradecraft standards outlined above ensure that analysts have an appropriate basis for the judgment.
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2 Intelligence Community judgments often include two important elements: judgments of how likely it is that something has happened con fidence levels in those judgments (low, moderate, and high) that refer to the evidentiary basis, logic and reasoning, and precedents that underpin the judgments. Determining Attribution in Cyber Incidents The nature of cyberspace makes attribution of cyber operations difficult but not impossible. Every kind of cyber operation malicious or not leaves a trail. US Intelligence Community analysts use this information, their constantly growing knowledge base o f previous events and known malicious actors, and their knowledge of how these malicious actors work and the tools that they use, to attempt to trace these operations back to their source. In every case, they apply the same tradecraft standards described in the Analytic Process above. Analysts consider a series of questions to assess how the information compares with existing knowledge and adjust their confidence in their judgments as appropriate to account for any alternative hypotheses and ambiguities. An assessment of attribution usually is not a simple statement of who conducted an operation, but rather a series of judgments that describe whether it was an isolated incident, who was the likely perpetrator , ordering or leading the operation.
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This report is a downgraded version of a more sensitive assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the more sensitive assessment but this version does not include the full supporting information on key elements of the influence campaign. TOP SECRET//HCS – P/SI – G//ORCON/NOFORN/FISA This report is a d eclassified version of a highly classified assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the highly classified assessment but this version does not include the full supporting information on key elements of the influence campaign. Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections ICA 2017 – 0 1D | 6 January 2017
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This report is a d eclassified version of a highly classified assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the highly classified assessment but this version does not include the full supporting information on key elements of the influence campaign. This page intentionally left blank.
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This report is a d eclassified version of a highly classified assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the highly classified assessment but this version does not include the full supporting information on key elements of the influence campaign. i Scope and Sourcing Information available as of 2 9 December 2016 was used in the preparation of this product. Scope This report includes an analytic assessment drafted and coordinated among T he C entral I ntelligence A gency (CIA) , The F ederal Bureau of Investigation (F BI ) , and The N ational S ecurity A gency (NSA) , which draws on intelligence information collected and disseminated by those three agencies. It covers the and media campaigns to influence US public opinion. The assessment focuses on activities aimed at the 2016 US presidential election and draws on our underst anding of previous Russian influence operations. This report is a d eclassified version of a highly classified identical to the highly classified assessment , but this document does not include the full supporting information, including specific intelligence on key elements of the influence campaign. Given the redactions, we made minor edits purely for readability and flow. We did not make an assessment of the impact that Russian activities had on the outcome of the 2016 election. The US Intelligence Community i s charged with monitoring and assessing the intentions, capabilities, and actions of foreign actors; it does not analyze US political p rocesses or US public opinion. New information continues to emerge, providing increased insight into Russian activities. Sourcing Many of the key judgments in this assessment rely on a body of reporting from multiple sources that are consistent with our understanding of Russian behavior. Insights into Russian efforts including specific cyber operations and Russian views of key US players derive from multiple corroborating sources. Some of our judgments about Kremlin preferences and intent are drawn from the behavior of Kremlin – loyal political figures, state media, and pro – Kremlin social media actors, all of whom the Kremlin either directly uses to convey messages or who are answerab le to the Kremlin. The Russian leadership invests significant resources in both foreign and domestic propaganda and places a premium on transmitting what it views as consistent, self – reinforcing narratives regarding its desires and redlines, whether on Uk raine, Syria, or relations with the U nited S tates .
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This report is a d eclassified version of a highly classified assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the highly classified assessment but this version does not include the full supporting information on key elements of the influence campaign. iii obtained in cyber operations publicly and in exclusives to media outlets and relayed material to WikiLeaks. Russian intelligence obtained and maintained access to elements of multiple US state or local electoral boards . DHS assess es that the types of systems Russian actors targeted or compromised were not involved in vote tallying. state – run propaganda machine contributed to the influence campaign by serving as a platform for Kremlin messaging to Russian and international audiences. We assess Moscow will apply lessons learned from its Putin – ordered campaign aimed at the US p residential election to future influence efforts worldwide, including against US allies and their election processes .
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This report is a d eclassified version of a highly classified assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the highly classified assessment but this version does not include the full supporting information on key elements of the influence campaign. iv Contents Scope and Sourcing Key Judgments Contents i ii i v 2016 US Presidential Election Putin Ordered Campaign T o Influence US Election Russian Campaign Was Multifaceted Influence Effort Was Boldest Yet in the US 1 2 5 5 Annexes A : Russia o Influence Politics, Fuel Discontent in US B : Estimative Language 6 13
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This report is a d eclassified version of a highly classified assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the highly classified assessment but this version does not include the full supporting information on key elements of the influence campaign. Presidential Election
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This report is a declassified version of a highly classified assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the highly classified assessment but this version does not include the full supporting information on k ey elements of the influence campaign . 1 Presidential Election Putin Ordered Campaign To Influence US Election We assess with high confidence that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US presidential election, the consistent goals of which were to undermine public faith in the US democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her electability and potential presidency. We further assess Putin and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for President – elect Trump. When it appeared to Moscow that Secretary Clinton was likely to win the election, the Russian influence campaign then focused on undermining her expected presidency. We also assess Putin and the Russian Government aspired to help President – elect discrediting Secretary Clinton and publicly contrast ing her unfavorably to him. All three agencies agree with this judgment. CIA and FBI have high confidence in this judgment; NSA has moderate confidence. In trying to influence the US election, we assess the Kremlin sought to advance its longstanding desire to undermine the US – led liberal democratic order, the promotion of which Putin and other senior Russian leaders view as Putin publicly pointed to the Panama Papers disclosure and the Olympic doping scandal as US – directed efforts to defame Russia, suggesting he sought to use disclosures to discredit the image of the U nited S tates and cast it as hypocritical. Putin most likely wanted to discredit Secretary Clinton because he has publicly blamed her since 2011 fo r inciting mass protests against his regime in late 2011 and early 2012 , and because he holds a grudge for comments he almost certainly saw as disparaging him. We assess Putin, his advisers, and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for President – elect T rump over Secretary Clinton. about the US presidential race avoided directly praising President – elect Trump, probably because Kremlin officials thought that any praise from Putin personally would backfire in the U nited S tates . Nonetheless, Putin publicly indicated a preference for President – elect pro – Kremlin figures spoke highly about what they saw as his Russia – friendly positions on Syria and Ukraine. Putin publicly contrasted the President – Moscow also saw the election of President – elect Trump as a way to achieve an international counterterrorism coalition against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Putin has had many positive experiences working with Western political leaders whose business interests made them more disposed to deal with Russia, such as former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and former German Chancellor G erhard Schroeder. Putin, Russian officials, and other pro – Kremlin pundits stopped publicly criticizing the US election process as unfair almost immediately
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