iranwatch/international/Iaea/iaea-irannuclearpowerprofile-2002.pdf Barakah in the UAE’s western region, is, in contrast to Bushehr, far from any city.152.

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Carnegie Endowment for International Peace © 2013 All rights reserved ˜e Carnegie Endowment does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented here are the authors™ own and do not necessarily re˚ect the views of the Endowment, its sta˛, or its trustees. For electronic copies of this report, visit: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 Phone: + 202 483 7600 Fax: + 202 483 1840

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˜˚˛˝˙ˆˇ˜ ˙ iii ˇ ˝ ˙ ˙ ˇ ˜ ˇ ˘ ˝˛ ˜ ˚˙ ˛ ˙ ˜ ˜ ˝ ˚ ˙ ˝ ˛˚ˇ˚ˇ THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM U N DER T HE SHAH .. 4 THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM U N DER T HE I S LAM I C R E P UBL I C 6 THE RE S UL TS 11 ˜˚ ˚ ˜ ˇ ˚ ˙ ˛˚ ˜ ˙˘˝˛ ˛ ˙ ˛ ˜ˇ ˘˛˚ ˜ ˛ ˜˚˙ ˇ˘˛˚ ˜ ˝˛˝ ˚ ˚ˇ˝ ˝ ˝ ˜ ˘ ˜ ˝˛ ˙ ˚ ˙ ˇ ˜ ˜˚ ˝ ˙ ˇ ˜ THE POL ITI CAL C O NT EX T (2009ŒPRE S E NT ) . 28 THE R OAD A HEAD . 30

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˜˚˛˝˙ˆˇ˜ ˙ v ˝ ˙ ˙ ˇ We wish to thank our colleagues George Perkovich, Charles Ferguson, James Acton, and Mark Hibbs for their thoughtful feedback. We are incredibly grateful to the Carnegie Endowment™s peerless publications team, particularly Rebecca White, Ilonka Oszvald, and Jocelyn Soly. ˜is work was made possible by a generous grant from the Arca Foundation. Special thanks go to Arca President Nancy R. Bagley and her husband Soroush Richard Shehabi (Abu Kamran). ˜e statements made and views expressed herein are solely our own. ŠAli Vaez and Karim Sadjadpour

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˜˚˛˝˙ˆˇ˜ ˙ vii ˇ ˘ ˝˛ Iran™s half-century nuclear odyssey has been marked by enormous ˝nancial costs, unpre – dictable risks, and unclear motivations. ˜e program™s covert history, coupled with the Iranian government™s prohibition of open media coverage of the nuclear issue, has pre – vented a much-needed internal debate about its cost-bene˝t rationale. Critical questions about the program™s economic e˙cacy and safety have been left unanswered. ON T HE G ROU N D: C O STS A N D RIS K S ˜e program™s costŠmeasured in lost foreign investment and oil revenueŠhas been well over $100 billion. ˜e Bushehr nuclear reactor took nearly four decades to complete and cost almost $11 billion (measured in today™s dollars), making it one of the most expensive reactors in the world. Bushehr provides merely 2 percent of Iran™s electricity needs, while 15 percent of the country™s generated electricity is lost through old and ill-maintained transmission lines. Despite aspirations to be self-su˙cient, Iran™s relatively small uranium resources will inhibit the country from having an indigenous nuclear energy program. Iran is the only nuclear state that is not a signatory to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and its nuclear materials and stockpiles are some of the least secure in the world. Most ominously, the Bushehr reactor sits at the intersection of three tectonic plates.

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viii ˙ ˙ ˜ ˙ ˝ ˙ ˜˜ POL I CY IM P L I CA TI O NS FOR T HE UNIT ED S T A T E S A N D LI KE- MIN DED A LL I E S Economic pressure or military force cannot fiendfl Iran™s nuclear program. It is entangled with too much prideŠhowever misguidedŠand sunk costs simply to be abandoned. ˜e nuclear issue will never be fully resolved absent a broader political settlement. ˜e only sustainable solution for assuring that Iran™s nuclear program remains purely peaceful is a mutually agreeable diplomatic solution. Given that political reconciliation is unlikely, the goal should be détente. Alternative options exist and should be highlighted. For example, Iran™s solar energy potential is estimated to be thirteen times higher than its total energy needs. By o˛ering Iran cutting-edge alternative energy technologies, a positive precedent could be set for other nuclear-hopefuls. Public diplomacy should complement nuclear diplomacy. E˛orts should make clear to Iranians that a prosperous, integrated IranŠas opposed to a weakened and isolated IranŠis in America™s interests. Washington should clarify what Iranians would collec – tively gain by a nuclear compromise (other than a reduction of sanctions and war threats) and explain how a more conciliatory Iranian approach would improve the country™s economy and advance its technologicalŠincluding peaceful nuclearŠprowess.

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˜˚˛˝˙ˆˇ˜ ˙ 1 ˚˙ ˛ ˙ Iran™s controversial nuclear program has dominated the international stage for more than a decade. ˜e United States and like-minded allies have relentlessly strived to coerce and compel Tehran to curb its nuclear activities. Its uranium enrichment program and e˛orts to obtain full nuclear fuel-cycle capabilities have been of particular concern. Attaining such capabilities would mean that Iran could fuel both nuclear power plants and atomic bombs. But negotiations, punishing economic and political sanctions, covert sabotage, and military threats have at best delayed Iran™s nuclear progress. In February 2013, the Interna – tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) estimated that Iran™s stockpile of net ˝ssile material had grown to nearly 7 tons of uranium enriched to 5 percent and 167 kilograms of uranium enriched to 20 percent. 1 ˜e latter development is particularly worrisome as the stockpil – ing of 20 percent enriched uranium signi˝cantly reduces (by more than 90 percent) the time required to obtain weapons-grade ˝ssile material from natural uranium. ˜e mate – rial Iran has currently accumulated, if further enriched, could be su˙cient for at least ˝ve nuclear weapons. Of further concern is the fact that Iran has started to install more advanced centrifuges at its Natanz enrichment facility, which would further upgrade its enrichment capacity. 2 While the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) entitles Iran to civilian and peace – ful nuclear energy, at issue is whether Tehran is in compliance with Article II of the treaty, which prohibits nations from weapons-related activity. ˜e same technology that ˙ š€•‡•…—–˜ƒ⁄…—‹…€˜š›…−›˜‡…‰˜ ƒ•›‡„˜—‡…›•…—–˜›š”•˜—‡‚•‡€š–˜ ‡…‰˜−•‡”™˜•‹”š‡•—˜‹‡š˜‡•˜‚š—•˜ ‰š„‡™š‰˜˚”‡…ˆ—˜…⁄›„š‡”˜ƒ”€”š——˜

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2 ˙ ˙ ˜ ˙ ˝ ˙ ˜˜ produces low-enriched uranium for nuclear reactors can be employed to produce highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon. ˜e United States and Israel have described the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran as fiunacceptablefl and an fiexistential threat.fl Meanwhile, the Iranian government has exhaustively portrayed its nuclear programŠwhich it insists is peacefulŠas the nation™s fiinalienable rightfl and a symbol of modernity and technological advancement on par with landing on the moon. Surveys, notwithstanding the inherent limitations of polls conducted over the phone in closed societies, often show a majority of Iranians in favor of the country™s continued development of a civilian nuclear energy program. Even the country™s opposition leaders, labeled fiseditionistsfl by the Iranian government, have asserted that Iran™s nuclear rights should be preserved. ˜e Iranian government prohib – its open media coverage of the nuclear issue, which has helped sti˚e a much-needed internal debate on the cost-bene˝t ratio – nale behind the country™s nuclear agenda. Crucial questions have not been asked in the public domain, let alone answered. For instance, what is the scale of Iran™s nuclear expenditure in ˝nancial terms? Why does Iran need to invest in front-end technologies, such as uranium mining, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication plants? Does nuclear power guarantee Iran™s long-term energy self-su˙ciency? Also unclear is how Iran™s nuclear program compares with those of other countries, the environmental burden of nuclear energy, and the safety and security of Iran™s nuclear plants and facilities. But these questions need answers. And a good place to start is with an estimation of the price tag on Iran™s half-century-long pursuit of nuclear technology. While most nuclear programs are ˝nancially opaque, years of clandestine activities render objective assess – ments of Tehran™s nuclear expenditure especially challenging. Additionally, the nuclear program has imposed indirect costs on the country™s economy in the form of colossal ˝nancial, technological, and energy sanctions. By examining publicly available data and interviewing key individuals, the broad contours of direct and indirect costs of the program materialize. ˜e economic merits of investment in front-end technology and ‹š˜š…”…−š…•‡„˜‡…‰˜•š›‹…„€›‡„˜ €‡…fi˜…⁄›„š‡”˜ƒ”˜‹‡š˜ ›−š˜‡•˜•‹š˜šŁƒš…—fi˜˚”‡…ˆ—˜ šŁ—•…€˜‹™‰”›‡”‚…˜—š›•”˜‡…‰˜ ”š…šfl‡‚„šŒš…š”€™˜ƒ•š…•„

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